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Distributions by Charitable Organizations: Their
Effect on Tax Exempt Status and Deductibility
of Donations Received
I. INTODUCrON

The number and importance of tax exempt organizations has
steadily grown in the past decade to the point where there were over
45,000 as of the beginning of 1963, as compared with 12,000 at the end
of 1952.1 "Unquestionably, the economic life of our nation has become so intertwined with foundations that unless something is done
about them, they will hold a dominant position in every phase of
American life." 2 This, according to the Patman Report, is because
were
"multimillion-dollar foundations have replaced the trusts which
3
broken up during the Theodore Roosevelt administration."
Both the Patman Report and the increased activity of the Internal
Revenue Service in its audit program4 demonstrate the increased
interest in the tax exempt field. In spite of this, however, not a great
deal has been written in this area in recent years. This note will
attempt to set forth and clarify the tests and requirements established
by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 5 and the Treasury Regulations
issued thereunder, by which an organization may receive, and maintain tax exempt status,6 and by which gifts to 7such organizations will
qualify as deductible charitable contributions.
Emphasis will be placed upon the effect on tax exempt status of
distributions by exempt organizations to organizations which have not
been ruled tax exempt. Consideration will also be given to inconsistencies among the sections of the Code in this area.

II. TEE TAx STATUTE
The receipt and maintenance of tax exemption and the qualification
as an organization to which deductible contributions may be made
1. CHAURAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUsNESs, 87Tu CONG., 2D
SESS., TAX ExEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHAiTABLE TRusTs: TsrEm IMPACT ON OUR
EcONOMY v (Comm. Print 1962) [hereinafter cited as PAamrAN REPORT, lST INSTALLmEN'r]. See also CHAmmAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITrEE ON SMALL BuSINrSS, 88niu
CONG., IST SEss., TAX EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEM IMPACT
ON OURiECONOMY (Comm. Print 1953) [hereinafter cited as PA mrx REPORT, 2D
INSTALLMENT].
2. PATmAN REPORT, IsT INSTALLMENT V.

3. Ibid.

4. See Rogovin, Exempt Organizations: New Proceduresand Current Policies within
the IRS, 20 J. TAXATION 28 (1964).
5. INT. REY. CODE OF 1954 is hereinafter cited as CODE.
6. CODE § 501.
7. Code §§ 170 (income tax), 2055 (estate tax), 2522 (gift tax).

1965 1

NOTES

1457

are understandably the two aspects of taxation of prime importance
to charitable institutions. Without adequate funds, they, as well as
the objects of their distributions, would become direct charges upon
the community, and would be forced out of existence. Without considerable tax advantages, adequate funds would not be available.
Thus, the primary legislative purpose behind the charitable deduction

has been the desire to encourage the support of organizations which
perform public services.
A. Tax Exemption
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in section 501(a)8

that certain described organizations 9 shall be exempt from taxation,
including corporations and other organizations which are organized

and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational, etc.

purposes, 10 "unless such organization is a 'feeder organization' (see

8. This provision is substantially the same as the one set out in the 1939 Code (as
well as in prior revenue acts) in § 101(6). The regulations which give the so-called
"organizational test" for qualifying for an exempt ruling under § 501, however,
are considerably more complete, and complex than the regulations for § 101(6) of the
1939 Code.
Since the regulations now set out more fully the attitude of the Treasury, and since
the requirements are so much more definite than ever before, they are of extreme
importance to prospective charitable organizations.
While an information return on form 990 or 990A is not required to be filed by an
organization claiming an exempt status under § 501 prior to the establishment by the
organization of such exempt status, if the date for filing an income tax return and
paying the tax occurs before the exempt status has been established, the organization
is required to file the return and pay the tax. Once exempt status is established,
however, the organization may file a claim for a refund of taxes paid for the period
for which its exempt status is established. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(c) (1958). This
is but one example of why it is so important to pay such close attention to detail in
these sections.
Further, contributors are not allowed a deduction for charitable contributions until
the ruling letter has been received by the donee organization. However, some flexibility
is provided in this latter case by giving the donee sufficient time to obtain a ruling
before taxes are asserted or deductions disallowed. See Sugarman & Fullmer, The
Requirements and Techniques for Filing Tax and Information Returns, 5 N.Y.U.
CoNF. or CItAITABLE FoUNDA-moNs 169 (1961).
The new regulations, while more strict, are at the same time more beneficial to
prospective organizations in two respects. First, since they provide means for more
efficient administrative handling, applications may be handled faster, and new rulings
will be more speedily forthcoming. Also, the organization which follows to the letter the
form established by the "organizational test" can be assured of a favorable ruling.
This should be welcomed by those who have a genuine desire to create a bona fide
charitable organization. See Eaton, Sugarman, Mansfield & Cutler, How to Draft the
Charter or Indenture of a Charity So as to Qualify for Federal Tax Exemption, 8
PrAc. LAVYER 13 (Oct. 1962).
9. Those which are described in CODE §§ 501(C) & (d), 401(a).
10. CoDy § 501(c), provides that "the following organizations are referred to in
subsection (a) [as being exempt from taxation unless otherwise denied the exemption
by §§ 502, 503, or 5041: . . . "(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund,
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section 502), or unless it engages in a transaction described in section
503 or in an activity described in section 504. However, the exemption
to 'unrelated business taxable income'' of such an
does not extend
12
organization."'
Qualifying for favorable treatment under section 501 is also significant for purposes other than the exemption granted thereby. With
few exceptions, the same terms are used to describe, in other Code
sections, the organizations to which deductible contributions may be
made for income tax purposes, 13 and to which deductible gifts and
bequests may be made for gift 14 and estate tax'1 purposes. The terms
used have further significance, in that many other laws, state and
federal, use similar terminology in their treatment of charitable and
educational organizations. 6
There are four main requirements with which an organization must
comply in order to receive a tax exempt ruling"7 under section 501
(c) (3). First, it must be both organized and operated for one or more
of the specified nonprofit purposes. There are actually two tests here
-the organizational test and the operational test. If an organization
fails to meet either test, it is not exempt. 8
An institution is organized for an exempt purpose if its charter both
limits the institution to one or more exempt purposes, and also does
not empower the organization to engage, other than in an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which are not in furtherance
of an exempt purpose. 9 An organization is operated for an exempt
purpose only if it actually engages primarily in activities which
or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
11. See CODE §§ 511-15.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-i (1958).
13. CODE § 170.
14. CODE § 2522.

15. CODE §§ 2055, 2106(a) (2).
16. Eaton, Sugarman, Mansfield & Cutler, supra note 8, at 14.
17. It is important to note that "an organization . . .is not exempt . . . merely
because it is not organized and operated for profit." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(a)(2)
(1958). An application must be filed with a district director and a ruling letter must
be received.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (1959).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (1) (1959). For examples of articles of incorporation which properly limit an organizations purpose, see 7 CCH 1965 STAND. FED.
TAx REP. ff 6391B.
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accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes specified in section

501(c)

(3).20

Although the policy of the Internal Revenue Service appears to
be that the ruling on an applicant will be determined primarily by

the contents of its charter or articles of incorporation,21 there have

been conflicting opinions as to whether "organized" and "operated" can
be separately analyzed such that the actual activities, rather than the
stated purposes and powers, will determine which way the Service will

rule.22 However, even if the actual activities were held to be determi-

native of the outcome of the ruling, articles of incorporation granting

powers which are broader than the exempt purposes will bar an exempt3
ruling, even though such broad powers are authorized by state law.2

The second requirement of section 501(c) (3) is that the net income
of the organization seeking exemption must not inure in whole or
in part to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. The
words "private shareholder or individual" refer to persons who have
a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.'

Profitable, or even competitive activities in furtherance of the
organization's religious or educational purposes, however, will not

affect its exempt status as long as all of the receipts are devoted to
the purpose for which the organization was founded, and no earnings

inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.25

It is this requirement which has been the most abused, and which,
therefore, is most vulnerable to challenge by Congress and the IRS.26
There are many forms of private inurement which will cause the loss
of exempt status.27 Distribution of profits in the form of salaries,2 8 and
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c)(1) (1959).
21. See Lebit, Tax Exempt Organizations,13 CrLv.-MAR. L. REv. 172, 174 (1964).
22. Samuel Freidland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
23. Announcement 62-19, 1962 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 8, at 20. See Eaton, Sugarman,
Mansfield & Cutler, supra note 8.
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(c) (1958).
25. In A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1435 (1963), the taxpayercorporation had been denied exemption by the Commissioner on the ground that it
was organized and operated for private gain, in that the religious and educational activities were only incidental to its "miraculous healing" and "commercial' activities, such
as the publication and sale of its magazines, books, pamphlets, Bibles, music records,
tape recordings and pictures. The Commissioner was reversed, however, and the
exemption was allowed: publication and sale of religious materials is a common
method of carrying out the religious and educational purposes of any exempt organization. The limitation is that no receipts may go to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
26. See PAThIN REPonT, IST & 2D INsTALLmENTS, supra note 1.
27. For an exposition on the purpose and the actual use of the private inurement
prohibition, see Note, The Inurement of Earnings to Private Beneft Clause of Section
501(c): A StandardWithout Meaning?, 48 MniN. L. REv. 1149 (1964).
28. Birmingham Business College, Inc. v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.
1960). In another case, the salary of each doctor in a privately operated clinic was
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the purchase at above-market prices 29 of securities from shareholders or
individuals 30 are common causes for challenge and revocation of an
organization's tax exempt status. 31 Generally, the policy of the IRS is
to deny an exemption when the private interests of the owners or
interests envisioned by Congress, are
founders, rather than the public
32
organization.
the
served by
The third requirement is that the organization, to be exempt, must
not carry on propaganda in any substantial part of its activities, or in
any other way attempt to influence legislation. This requirement has
not been the subject of much dispute, for the reason that very few
organizations which have attempted to influence legislation have even
sought an exemption. 33 There might be a tendency to forget the
leeway built into this requirement, by completely prohibiting activities to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise. This is
unnecessary, since the IRS does not compel a restriction greater than
the statute requires, and such a prohibition may prevent such activities in which the organization may participate either innocently, or
necessarily in furtherance of its primary purpose.
Lobbying for an exempt purpose, such as would be done indirectly
through a report to a legislative committee by an organization formed
for the testing of public safety, should not be held to fall within this
prohibition, though no case was found so stating. The policy behind
the prohibition certainly would not seem to apply to lobbying carried
out in furtherance of an exempt purpose. Caution should be exercised,
based upon the number of patients he brought in. The clinic's exemption was lost as
a result. Lorain Ave. Clinic, 31 T.C. 141 (1958).
29. A sale to a private shareholder or individual at below-market prices is in the
same category.
30. Kolkney v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
31. Other schemes, designed to abuse the private inurement requirement, have
been used by organizations, and these will undoubtedly come to be more closely
scrutinized in the future. One scheme is for a foundation to acquire all the stock
of a regular business corporation, dissolve it, sell, lease or license the assets to an
operating company, and receive in return most of the operating company's profits.
These profits are then used to pay off any indebtedness incurred in the acquisition of the
BuLL. 128.
original corporation. See Rev. Rul. 55-420, 1954-2 CUMr.
Another questionable plan is for a shareholder to contribute § 308 stock to his own
foundation. The corporation then redeems the stock, and there is no tax effect on the
contributor; he will effectively take a tax-free dividend from the corporation, in that
he will receive a deduction for the contribution to the foundation of such stock.
The regulations set out in some detail what constitutes inurement and who might
have a prohibited private interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)-i(a) (1959). Family
membership is determined by the attribution rules of § 267(c)(4). Transactions
prohibited by the private inurement clause are set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-i(a)
(1959) (with examples in Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(c) (1959)) and CODE § 503(c).
32. This policy, and the suggested solutions to the many problems involved in the
many attempts to circumvent it, are fully presented in the PA.-AAN REPoRT, 1sT &
2D INsTALLmENTs, supra note 1.

33. Lebit, supra note 21, at 175.
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however, to insure that lobbying is not a substantial part of the
organization's activities.
The fourth requirement is that the organization must not participate

or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate
for public office. 34 This may cause more losses of exemption than
the propaganda prohibition, because here not even an insubstantial
amount of intervention or participation inrelation to the organization's

total activities will be allowed. In fact, the regulations provide that
if the articles of incorporation allow such activity, though the organi-

zation is35 not actually engaged in it,the exemption will not be
allowed.
B. Tax Deduction

Section 170(a) of the Code allows an income tax deduction for a
"charitable contribution," as defined by section 170(C),36 and as
34. It is interesting to note that § 170(c) (2), allowing charitable deductions, contains a limitation on influencing legislation, as does § 501(c) (3), but does not expressly
prohibit political campaigning. Thus, observance of both prohibitions is necessary
in order to maintain exempt status. The omission from § 170 of the campaigning
prohibition was probably a mere oversight, as there appears no reason why such activity
should be allowed in one case but not in the other.
35. Treas. Reg. § 501(c)(3)-1(b) (3)(ii)
(1959).
36. CODE § 170 (a), allows as a deduction "any charitable contribution (as defined in
subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year." CoDE § 170(c),
defines "charitable contribution" as "a contribution or gift to or for the use of(1) A State, a Territory, a possession of the United States . . . but only if the
contribution or gift is made for exclusively public purposes.
(2) A Corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or
under the law of the United States, any State or Territory, the District of Columbia,
or any possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual; and
(D) no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be
deductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the United States
or any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B).
(3) A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary unit or society of, or
trust or foundation for, any such post or organization(A) organized in the United States or any of its possessions, and
(B) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.
(4) In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic fraternal society,
order, or association, operating under the lodge system, but only if such contribution or
gift is to be used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
(5) A cemetery company owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of its
members, or any corporation chartered solely for burial purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its charter to engage in any business not necessarily incident
to that purpose, if such company or corporation is not operated for profit and no part
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limited in amount by section 170(b). 37 The fact that an organization
is tax exempt under section 501 does not necessarily mean that a
contribution to that organization is deductible by the donor. The
classes of organizations, contributions to which may be deducted,
are considerably fewer in number than the classes of organizations
which are entitled to tax exemption.38
In general, a donation will qualify for a deduction if it is made to
a section 501 exempt organization, but the donee organization must
meet certain requirements in addition to those of section 501. The
two most troublesome ones are set out in section 170(c).
The first, the "domestic organization" requirement, is that if a
deduction is to be received, the "corporation, trust, or community
chest, fund, or foundation" which is receiving the donation, must be
"created or organized in the United States . . .or under the law of
the United States. .

. ."39

The other, the "domestic use" requirement,

is that a contribution by a corporation will be deductible "only if it
of the net earnings of such company or corporation inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual."
37. CoDE § 170(b) (1) limits an individual's deduction for contributions to 20% of
his adjusted gross income, except that an additional 10% is allowable for charitable
contributions to certain hospitals, medical research organizations, educational institutions and churches. For contributions made after 1963, the Revenue Act of 1964
expands the extra 10% deduction to include (1) contributions to any organization to
which the basic 20% limitation now applies if the organization normally receives a
substantial part of its support from the public or a governmental unit and (2) contributions to a federal, state or local government unit if the contribution or gift is
made exclusively for public purposes. This extra 10% allowance applies only if the
charitable contribution is paid to the organization and not just for the use of the
organization.
Con E § 170(b) (2) limits a corporation's deduction for contributions to 5% of net
income computed without the contributions deduction, but also allows a 5 year carryover of contributions in excess of this 5%.
38. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 18 T.C. 188, petition for review dismissed, 201 F.2d 512
(8th Cir. 1953).
39. CODE § 170(c) (2) (A). If the organization does not qualify under this sectionthat is, it was not created or organized in the United States, etc.-a contribution thereto
is not deductible under § 170. Muzaffer ErSelcuk, 30 T.C. 962 (1958); Dora F. WVelti,
1 T.C. 905 (1943). "Prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of 1938 there were no
restrictions as to the place of creation of charitable organizations to which individuals
might make deductible contributions. (Section 102(c) of the Revenue Act of 1935,
which first permitted a deduction for corporate charitable contributions, limited that
deduction to contributions to 'domestic' organizations which used such contributions
within the United States.) The rule as to individual contributions was changed with
the passage of the Revenue Act of 1938. Section 23(o) of that Act provided that
contributions by individuals were deductible only if the recipient was a 'domestic'
organization." See discussion of that section in Ways and Means Committee Report,
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1939-1 Cum. BULL. (Part 2) 728, 742.
"Section 224 of the Revenue Act of 1939 substituted for the requirement that a
qualifying organization be 'domestic,' the requirement that it have been [sic] 'created
or organized in the United States or any possession thereof,' etc. In substantially the
same form, this requirement was re-enacted as section 170(c)(2) (A) of the 1954
Code." See Rev. Rul. 63--,52, 1963-2 CUrM. BuLL. 101, 102.
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is to be used within the United States..."40 "exclusively for religious,
charitable.. ."41 purposes.I
The domestic use requirement is imposed only in the case of a
gift by a corporation to a "trust, chest, fund, or foundation."43 It does
not apply to a gift by an individual, nor to a gift by a corporation
to another institution organized in the corporate form under applicable
state law. The requirement, then, becomes a problem only when a
corporate donor makes a contribution to a charity which is itself organized in non-corporate form.44 On the other hand, the first sentence
of section 170(c) (2), which lists the types of organizations to
which deductible contributions may be made generally, specifically
includes corporations in the list of donees which must meet the
domestic organization requirement.
It could have been argued that the words "trust, chest, fund, or
foundation" should be construed to include corporations, in that the
term "charitable foundation," being somewhat colloquial, usually refers
to an organization (corporation or trust) organized and operated
exclusively for one or more of the purposes listed in section 501
(c) (3). 4 5 In a 1937 ruling, however, the IRS chose not to construe
the phrase as including corporate donees, and stated that:
there is no indication that Congress intended to include within the exceptions
domestic corporations whose funds are used exclusively for charitable
purposes in a foreign country. Therefore, contributions made by the M

Company, a domestic corporation, to the 0 Corporation, another domestic
corporation, whose funds are used for charitable purposes in a foreign

country, are allowable as a deduction ....46

This position has been followed in other rulings. In one involving
corporate contributions to United Jewish Appeal, Inc., which were
then used by the donee abroad, the IRS said that "corporations are
not listed as one of the types of organizations contributions to which
must be used in the United States or its possessions in order to be
allowed as deductions."47
40. CODE § 170(c) (2). Compare this requirement, which applies only to corporate
contributions, with that of § 170(c) (2) (A), which relates only to the place of creation
of the charitable organization to which deductible contributions may be made, but
which does not restrict the area in which deductible contributions may be used.
41. CODE § 170(c) (2) (B). This requirement is written into the last sentence of §
170(c) (2) by reference.
42. Contributions to other types of organizations are, of course, allowed, and these
are set out in § 170(c)(1), (3), (4), and (5). Under § 170(c)(2), there is also the
private inurement prohibition found in § 503(c), and the lobbying prohibition discussed
at note 34 supra.
43. CODE § 170(c)(2).
44. Eaton, Sugarman, Mansfield & Cutler, supranote 8, at 29.
45. U. So. CAL. 1960 TAx INst. 855, 856.
46. I.T. 3048, 1937-1 Cum. BuLL. 85.
47. Special Ruling, March 14, 1947, 4 CCH 1947 STm-. Fa. TAx RBE. ff 6135.
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In another ruling, handed down the same year, it was stated that:
Both the Greek War Relief Association, Inc., U.S.A. and the United
Jewish Appeal of Greater New York are domestic corporations organized
under the laws of a State of the United States and inasmuch as domestic
corporations are not one of the types of organizations contributions to
which must be used in the United States or its possessions in order to be
allowable . . . as deductions to corporate donors . . . it follows that contributions made by corporate donors to the two organizations named are
deductible by such donors .... 48

There is a more recent indication of the Treasury's position regarding corporate donees which distribute donated funds abroad.
The Service has indicated that in certain cases it will allow a domestic
business corporation a deduction for a contribution to a domestic charitable
trust, which, in turn, makes a contribution to a domestic charitable corporation, which spends the funds for charitable purposes in a foreign country.
The deduction will be allowed by the Service where the contribution by
the trust to the charitable corporation goes into the corporation's general
funds. It will be disallowed, however, where there is an understanding
between the parties in the first instance that the contribution will be used
in a foreign country. 49

The domestic use requirement, then, may be avoided by being certain
that corporate donors give only to corporate donees if the funds are
to be used abroad. The restriction seems more like a trap than a
useful limitation, and as such, is a rule of narrow application. The
domestic organization requirement, on the other hand, is of much
broader application, as it applies to contributions by all donors, and
not just by corporations. Because of this restriction, a gift directly
to a foreign charity, no matter how valid its purpose, will not be
deductible.50
The question may be asked why the domestic use requirement
should have this extremely narrow application, while the domestic
organization requirement is applied so broadly. Although no definite
answer may be given thereby, a look at the legislative history of these
provisions may prove helpful.
A charitable deduction was first allowed by the Revenue Act of
1917,51 which provided for a deduction in the case of a citizen or
resident of the United States who contributed to a corporation or
association organized and operated exclusively for the named exempt
purposes. This was narrowed slightly by the Revenue Act of 1918,2
which provided that a nonresident alien could obtain deduction only
48. Special Ruling, May 8, 1947, 4 CCH 1947 STAND. FED.

TAX REP.

1 6175.

49. 17 A.B.A. SECTON OF TAxA-riox BuLL. 83 (Oct. 1963).
50. Dora F. Welti, supra note 39; Louise K. Herter, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 78

(1961).

51. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300.
52. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a) (11), 40 Stat. 1057.
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for gifts made to domestic corporations. This change was regarded
as merely clerical. 53 These same requirements were carried to the
Revenue Act of 1934, 54 which broadened the class of possible donees
from corporations alone to "a corporation, or trust, or community
chest, fund, or foundation."55 There still was no domestic organization
or use requirement, however.
By the Revenue Act of 1935,58 a charitable deduction was allowed
to a corporation for the first time. It was here, furthermore, that the
domestic organization requirement was first imposed. A corporate
deduction was made allowable for a gift to "a domestic corporation, or
domestic trust, or domestic community chest, fund, or foundation" 51
organized and operated for an exempt purpose. The language thus
far in this section is basically the same as that in the 1934 act granting the deduction for donations by individuals, except for the addition of the word domestic before each possible donee. Then the
ancestor of the present domestic use requirement was added: "(but
in the case of contributions or gifts to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation of the word domestic before each possible donee. Then the
United States exclusively for such purposes), ..."58 The committee
reports indicate only that the prime motive behind the allowance of
a deduction for a corporate donation was simply the encouragement
of corporations to support unemployable people by donations to community chests and other charities. Corporations were beginning, at
that time, to help the federal government carry out its announced
policy of throwing the burden of caring for those people back on the
state and local communities, and this encouragement was in furtherance of that policy.5 9 No mention was found of any reason why
the domestic use requirement was placed on a corporate gift while
not even the domestic organization requirement was applied to an
individual's donation at that time.
It might be noted that a proposed House bill in 1921 attempted
to extend to corporations the deduction for charitable donations,60
as did several other proposals between 1918 and 1935, when it was
finally allowed. 6 ' The 1921 bill used the same language as the section
53. H.R. REP. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 50 (1918).
54. Thus, there was still no domestic use or domestic organization requirement.
55. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(o) (2), 48 Stat. 680.
56. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014.
57. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, amending Revenue Act
of 1934, ch. 277, § 23, 49 Stat. 1014 (added subdivision (r)).
58. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014.
59. H.R. Rzp. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1935).
60. H.R. 8245, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. § 234(a) (15) (1921). A senate amendment
struck out the provision. See H.R. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1921).
61. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.

204 (1928).
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allowing a deduction for a contribution by an individual in the 1934
act.62 So if that bill had passed, there would have been neither a
domestic use or organization requirement on donations by corporations.
The Revenue Act of 1936,63 left these sections on corporate and
individual contributions exactly the same as they were in the 1935
act.64 In 1938, however, the domestic organization requirement was

made applicable to donations by individuals. 65 The language used was
the same as that made applicable to corporate gifts in the 1935 act6"
and carried over to the 193667 and the 193868 acts. The reason for
this added restriction was stated in the Report of the House Ways and
Means Committee:
The exemption from taxation of [i.e., the deduction for] money or property

devoted to charitable . . . purposes is based upon the theory that the

Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden.... The United States derives no such benefit from gifts
to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation [i.e., the domestic organization requirement] is consistent with the above theory. If the recipient,
however, is a domestic organization and the fact that some portion of its
funds is used in other countries for charitable
and other purposes . . . will
69
not affect the deductibility of the gift.

It would appear from this language that the legislative intent was

certainly not to apply the domestic use requirement to gifts made
by individuals. Added to this is the fact that if the requirement had
been intended to apply, the specific language of the 1936 act" providing for it could have been copied into the 1938 act along with

the language making the domestic organization requirement applicable.
Although the policy was stated to have been the same toward
gifts made by corporations and by individuals, 71 the difference in
treatment persisted until the Revenue Act of 1942.72 This act suspended the domestic use requirement, still applicable only in the
62. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23(o)(2), 48 Stat. 680. The only exception
is that the 1921 House bill would not have allowed a deduction for a contribution by
a corporation to a trust.
63. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 23(o)(2) & (q), 49 Stat. 1648.
64. Except that § 23(r), created by the 1935 Act was changed to § 23(q) in the
1936 Act.
65. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 23(o) (2), 52 Stat. 447.
66. Section 102(c) of the 1935 Act, creating a new subsection (r) to be added to
§ 23 of the 1934 Act.
67. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 23(q), 49 Stat. 1648.
68. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 23(q), 52 Stat. 447.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938).
70. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
71. Supra note 69.
72. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 23(q), 56 Stat. 798.
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case of corporate gifts to non-corporate donees, for the duration of
World War II. In its report on the provision, the Senate Finance Committee said:
It is believed in view of the present situation [i.e., the war] that it is
unwise to limit this deduction to contributions or gifts used within the United
States or any of its possessions. Accordingly, the bill provides that the
deduction shall be allowed to corporations created or organized for the
purposes described even though such gifts or contributions are used outside
of the United States or its possessions. 3

And in the Congressional discussion it was said, 'Weremoved that
[domestic use] limitation because there are at this time abundant
reasons for many organizations, such as the Red Cross and others,
spending money outside the United States."74 The suspension was
kept in force until the end of the war, although in the 1948 Revenue
Revision Bill7 5 an attempt was made to eliminate the domestic use

requirement altogether. The reason given by the House Ways and
Means Committee for the attempt was the desire to place the charitable deduction under the income, estate and gift taxes on a comparable basis.

Probably the most important amendments deal with the question of
whether or not contributions to religious, educational, charitable, etc., organizations are deductible if such contributions are used outside of the
United States or its possessions. Present law provides that such deductions
will be denied under the corporate income tax beginning in 1949 if such
contributions are made to unincorporated organizations. The bill removes
this limitation as far as domestic corporations are concerned, but adds it, in
the case of the income tax, on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.
Such a limitation is already in the law in the case of the estate and gift
taxes on nonresident aliens. Thus, residents of the United States and
domestic corporations will not find their contributions limited in this fashion,
although the limitation will apply in the case of nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations.7 6

Unfortunately, no action was taken on this bill beyond its passage by

the House, and the inconsistent treatment both as between individuals
and corporations, and as among the income, estate, and gift taxes
was carried over into the Code as it appears today.
It is indeed strange that there should be this dichotomy between
the treatment of corporations on the one hand, and of non-corporate
donors on the other. In the area of charitable, educational and religious organizations it would seem that there would be more overlap
among the various forms of organization than clear cut distinction.
73.
74.
75.
76.

S.REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1942).
88 CONG. BEc. 7801 (1942).
H.R. 6712, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. § 113(b) (1) (1948).
H.R. EP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1948).
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Thus, a foundation, chest or fund could be organized in the corporate
form although a trust certainly could not. While the policy of the
Code seems to be in favor of equal treatment of similar organizations,
nevertheless, this dichotomy does exist. As long as the donor is in
the corporate form, the domestic use requirement applies to gifts
made to donees which are not corporations. And as long as the
donations are made to organizations which are in the cooperate form,
the requirement is not imposed.
It is widely believed that the domestic organization requirement,
applicable to donations by all donors, is based on the theory that since
the tax advantage is given because charitable donations relieve the
government of part of its burden, no such advantage should adhere
to a donation going to an organization which helps carry out the
burdens of another government. 7 However, our government certainly
has a duty to help keep world peace and improve international relations, and gifts by our citizens to charities of other countries undoubtedly further these goals.
The domestic use requirement is also based, at least in part, on
this same questionable theory. Since it applies only to corporatedonors, however, the thinking may have been that the only way to
justify a deduction for a corporate gift, which was allowed only as a
business expense before 1935, 71 was to require that some local use
be made of the gift, such that benefit would result, by good will for
instance, to the donor corporation. Also, under general corporation
law a benefit to the donor corporation usually has been required to
justify a gift. Recently, however, the justifications for corporate
giving have become greatly liberalized,79 and this theory is of little
importance today.
C. Inconsistencies
Section 2055, allowing an estate tax deduction for a charitable
devise or bequest, contains generally the same requirements as those
appearing in section 170. However, there is no domestic organization
requirement in section 2055.80 Thus, a bequest or devise to a foreign
charity may be deductible for estate tax purposes, while an inter
vivos gift to the same donee will not be deductible for income tax
purposes.
One may well wonder why the domestic organization requirement
is not imposed upon a bequest or devise under section 2055, or
77. Eaton, Charitable Foundations Making Gifts Abroad, 17

(1961).
78. Revenue Act of 1934, cb. 277, § 23(a), (o), 48 Stat. 680.
79. See Comment, 6 UTAn L. REv. 270 (1958).
80. See note 82 infra.

TAx
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upon a gift under section 2522. As was seen in the discussion of
the history of this requirement, 81 the desire of Congress was to
provide equal treatment under the income, estate and gift taxes.
There seems to be no logical explanation for these inconsistencies,
then, other than that Congress went about providing the same policy
in different ways in the various sections. The differences appear to
be arbitrary and unintentional-a natural result of different committees
having sponsored the various provisions.
Another difference is seen in the form a donee organization may
take in order to insure deductibility of gifts as between the income
and estate tax sections. In section 170(c) (2) corporations, trusts, and
community chests, funds and foundations are all placed in the same
position. Section 2055, however, makes no reference to chests, funds,
foundations or unincorporated associations. It is doubtful that a
deduction for a devise or bequest to one of these organizations would
be denied because of this failure to include the specific language used
in section 170, but such a result is possible.
Other minor differences between the estate and income tax sections
may be found. While a deduction for income tax purposes is allowed
for a contribution to a cemetery company, it is not specifically provided for under section 2055. But the estate tax treatment of
veterans groups is broader than that of the income tax sections. And,
neither the requirement of domestic use of section 170(c) (2) nor
the sick benefit requirements of section 501(c) (8) appear in the
estate tax provisions.
The gift tax provisions, like those of the estate tax, contain no
requirement of domestic organization. This requirement, however,
does appear in some less important sections 82 in addition to section

170(c) (2) (A).
Unlike section 2055, however, section 2522 (a) (2) uses the "corporation, or trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation" language of
section 170(c) (2). Thus, a strict construction of these sections
might well allow a deduction for inter vivos gifts to these organizations for income and gift tax purposes, but not for devises and
bequests to them for estate tax purposes. Again, however, although
a ruling to this effect is possible, it is highly doubtful.
Two other differences occur among these sections. The encourage81. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
82. E.g., CODE § 170(c)(3), (4) (contributions to fraternal lodges and veterans'
organizations). CODE § 702(a) (4) (charitable contributions by partnerships), requires
domestic organization by reference to § 170(c), as does § 642(c) (charitable
deductions by trusts and estates). Section 170(c) (5) (contributions to non-profit
cemeteries), however, does not have the requirement. The sections which apply to
non-resident aliens all require domestic organization. CODE 88 873(c) (income tax),
2106(a)(2)(A)(ii) (estate tax), 2552(b) (2) & (5) (gift tax).
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ment of art appears as a specific purpose of the estate and gift tax
deductions, but not of the income tax deduction nor of the section

501 exemption. Also, none of the estate, gift, or income tax deductions name as an exempt purpose the testing for public safety, while
this is recognized as an exempt purpose under section 501(c) (3).
exempt organization,
This is another example of what could be an
83

donations to which would not be deductible.
Domestic use is not found as a gift tax requirement under section
the gift tax sections
2522. However, it is found in both the estate and
aliens. 84

applicable to transfers by non-resident

Again, there appears to be no rational basis for these inconsistencies

in the requirements for exemption and deductibility of donations.
The policies of the gift and estate tax sections have long been held

to be the same, 85 or at least parallel, and the congressional intent

has been to equate the policies of the three taxes. 86 Because of this

overlapping policy, and the unorganized fashion by which each requirement was made a part of the Code,8 7 it is more than likely that
the inconsistencies are coincidental and unintentional.
III.

FOREiGN DisTmuTnoNs

Perhaps the most significant difference among these sections allowing exemptions and deductions for charities and charitable contribu-

tions is that neither the domestic organization requirement of section
170(c) (2) (A) nor the domestic use requirement of section 170(c) (2)
appears necessary for the granting of an exemption under section
501(c) (3). This may not be as important for organizations which

receive all their funds through charitable donations, as these are not
83. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
84. CODE §§ 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii), 2522(b)(3) & (4). The requirement, however,
does not seem to apply to domestic charitable corporations, while itdoes to trusts,
etc. Nor does itseem to apply to deductions for income tax purposes under § 873(c),
but the reference inthat section to § 170 isambiguous.
85. "The two types of tax thus followed a similar course, like problems and purposes
being expressed in like language." Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 312 (1945). See
to the same effect, Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945). "[T]he purpose
of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax by preventing tax-free depletion of the
transferor's estate during his lifetime" and therefore "the federal estate tax and the
federal gift tax .. .are construed in pani materia." Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S.
106-07 (1950).
86. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
87. See Eaton, supra note 77, at 43. The 1954 Code reveals "a continuing legislative
tendency to seek highly specific and inflexible solutions by adding more detailed and
complex exceptions, limitations and conditions to provisions that really are basically
inadequate and unsatisfactory, or already overly lengthy and complex. Furthermore,
the very specificity of some of these amendments seems to have little to do with
either the amendments purpose or with the underlying policy of the statute amended."
Rea, Changes in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 Affecting Charitable Organizations,
27 RocKY MT. L. REv. 270, 304 (1955).
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considered income to the donee anyway. However, it takes on great
importance for those institutions which are supported by dues, or by
income from a "related trade or business,m such as a hospital.
According to the regulations, the requirement of domestic organization in section 170(c) (2) (A) does not prevent a deduction for a
donation to a domestic charity which in turn distributes part or all
of its funds abroad. 9 There is no language in the Code or in the
regulations under section 501(c)(3) comparable to this allowance
of a deduction for certain gifts to donees which in turn expend the
funds abroad. However, nothing is said to the contrary, so as to
require domestic use in order to maintain exempt status. 90 Moreover, the belief has been expressed that there are many exempt
organizations which spend substantially all of their funds abroad.
A. Policy of Control
The main concern seems to be with domestic organizations which
donate primarily to one or more particular foreign organizations over
whose expenditures the American donor-organizations have little or
no control. Thus, the test is whether in substance the donor may be
said to be soliciting funds for the use of foreign organizations.
Examples are where the American donor is established by the foreign
donees, or to substantially increase the proportion of such donations,
where the domestic donor is required, by its charter or by a contract,
to solicit funds expressly for a foreign organization. Further, if the
domestic donor uses its funds principally for the support of foreign
organizations, donations to the donor may be deemed made to or
for the use of the foreign organizations rather than the domestic
organization, unless the domestic organization retains control over
the use of its funds in the hands of the foreign donees. 92
The answer seems to be that the gift is not 'for the use of the foreign
charity unless it is equivalent to a gift in trust for the foreign charity. If
88. See CODE § 513, which defines "unrelated trade or business" as any trade or
business the conduct of which is not substantially related to the purpose constituting
the basis for which the organization was granted an exemption. Income from this source
is called "unrelated business taxable income" by § 512, and the tax, as provided in §
11, is imposed on such income by § 511.
89. "A contribution to an organization described in § 170(c) is deductible even
though some portion of the funds of the organization may be used in foreign countries
for charitable or educational purposes." Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(a) (1) (1958). This
regulation was apparently the subject of intensive study in 1959, see A.B.A. SEcaToN OF
TAXATION BULL. 33 (Oct. 1959), and the only current ruling found set out the same
rule, giving certain examples. See Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 101. See also
Louise K. Herter, supranote 50.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (1959).
91. Eaton, supra note 77, at 47. See Quiggle & Myers, Tax Aspects of Charitable
Contributionsand Bequests by Individuals, 28 Foannvm L. REv. 579, 582 n.11 (1960).
92. A.B.A. SEcTIoN OF TAXATON BU=L. 34 (Jan. 1960)..
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the gift is not earmarked for the foreign charity and the domestic foundation
legally and equitably has freedom of action with respect to the gift, i.e.,
has the right and power to use the gift otherwise than for the foreign charity,
then the gift is not in trust for the foreign charity, and a deduction 9should
3
be allowed. In short, the phrase 'for the use of' means 'in trust for.'

The IRS's concern has manifested itself in letters to charitable
organizations from District Directors to the effect that a review of
the organization's annual information return has shown that dona-

tions were made to organizations which have not received an exempt
ruling under section 501(c) (3). 94 These letters usually request further information relating to the purposes for which the recipient was

organized. But more important, they may add a warning that a
continuation of gifts to these non-exempt organizations may jeopardize
the donor's tax exempt status.9 5 During 1963, moreover, the IRS

revised the annual reports which exempt organizations must file

(Form 990A), 98 and it was7 announced that the use of the warning
9
letter would be expanded.
Also, in an administrative guide recently released by the IRS,
describing rules and procedures for organizations seeking tax exemption, called "How to Apply For Exemption For Your Organization"

it was stated that the following information must be attached to an
application for exemption if any funds are or will be expended in
foreign countries:98
(1) the manner in which and by whom recipients are or will be selected;
(2) names of recipient organizations and/or purposes for which the funds
are or will be expended; (3) extent to which you control or will control
expenditure of funds donated by you to foreign organizations and whether
there is or will be any required reporting of such expenditures to you; and
(4) whether contributions are or will be solicited by you and earmarked
for specific foreign distributees.

This administrative practice is used in order to control donations
and to insure that they are used for proper purposes. The best way
93. Eaton, supra note 77, at 60.
94. Although § 2055(a) (2) allows a deduction, for estate tax purposes, from

a decedent's gross estate for bequests to foreign charities, it may be of little value
since some Internal Revenue agents auditing estate tax returns are requiring that the
foreign charity be formally exempt by the Service as an organization described in
§ 501(c) (3). A.B.A. SECTION OF TAxAnTION Bu=t. 39 (Jan. 1959).
95. See Yager, PracticalPointers on How to Get and Keep Tax-exempt Status for an
Organization,7 J. TAXATION 62 (1957).

96. See note 8 supra.
97. 17 A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BuLL. 85 (Oct. 1963). This procedure stems
from the IRS's expanded exempt organization audit program, as reported originally in
16 A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BuLL. 63 (Jan. 1963), and further expanded in 16
A.B.A. SEciOrN OF TAXATION BuLL. 20 (April 1963). See also 16 A.B.A. SECTION OF
TAXATION BuLL. 131 (July 1963).
98. 7 CCH 1965 STA-D. FED. TAx REP. 6391A.
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to get information about a prospective donee is to require it to apply
for an exempt ruling. However, the IRS unofficially admits that
other evidence as to the propriety of the uses to which the donee's
funds are put will be accepted, and thus that a ruling letter covering
the donee is not required in all cases. 99
There is no requirement in the Code, nor in the Treasury's own
regulations, that an organization exempt under section 501(c) (3)
must donate only to other section 501(c) (3) organizations in order
to remain exempt.
Thus, although the Service may well be justified in its exercise of
administrative control, it is doubtful whether it would be upheld in
court. 100 This doubt is most likely the reason for the Service's admittedly liberal attitude toward its attempt to require domestic use
of funds donated to exempt organizations. Irrespective of the Treasury's attitude toward gifts to donees which do not qualify for an
exempt ruling under section 501, the general feeling is that the donor's
status will be safe if it can be proven that the eventual donee is
within the provisions of section 501(c)(3), and could obtain an
exemption if one were sought. 01' But donors are warned to be
cautious:
If a substantial contribution is made to an organization not approved as
exempt by the Revenue Service, the foundation may lose its exemption.
Generally, if not more than 10% of the funds distributed in a year are
granted to organizations not approved by the Revenue Service, the Service
will on the first occasion issue only a warning that such contribution if
102
continued will jeopardize the foundation's exemption.

This warning, however, is not official, and certainly is not final.
Exemption rulings granted to organizations are effective only so
long as there are no material changes in the organization's character,
purposes, and method of operation. 10 3 A change in a donor-organization's policy so as to make most of its donations to questionable
donees, or to substantially increase the proportion of such donations,
or to make even a single large donation to a non-exempt organization
99. Eaton, supra note 77, at 48.
100. The Service undoubtedly feels that this is the only way it can exercise administrative control over the thousands of charitable organizations in existence. "In spite of
the fact that the Service's threat to withdraw an exemption would not be upheld in
litigation, one has only to scan the high sounding and puritanical titles of many organizations on the Attorney General's subversive list to feel at least a twinge of sympathy
for this administrative practice." Yager, supra note 95, at 63.
101. See Eaton, supra note 77, at 54; Yager, supra note 95.
102. Sugarman, Foundations Established for Corporate Giving, N.Y.U. 14TH INST.
ox FED. TAx 77, 108-09 (1956).
103. Rev. Rul. 58-617, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 260.

1474

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL. 18

could well be considered a change in the method of operation, so as
to cause a revocation of exempt status."0 This appears to be in line
with the de minimus doctrine which runs throughout the Code, and
it corresponds to the established rule that in order to qualify for an
exemption, an organization's activities need be only primarily, not
exclusively, in furtherance of its exempt purposes. It might be noted
here that this rule is the result of a realistic attitude on the part of
the Treasury. Although the Code says that the organization must be
organized and operated "exclusively" for the named exempt purposes,
the regulations have interpreted this to mean only "primarily."'15
This is an extremely important administrative practice, in that the
Treasury could prohibit a great many foreign distributions were it to
adhere to the "exclusively" requirement.
Gifts by a domestic charitable organization to a foreign charity
increase the policing problems of the IRS. Difficulties are created
by differences in law, language and custom, as well as by the more
obvious factors of distance and lack of jurisdiction. This is perhaps
one of the primary reasons why the IRS is hesitant to exempt a
domestic charity without the foreign donee's first obtaining its own
exempt ruling.0 6
The problem caused by the inability of the IRS to control funds
104. It should be noted that an exemption can be revoked retroactively. Automobile
Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). In Society of Good Neighbors, 16
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 306 (1957), the Commissioner's 1939 ruling that petitioner
was exempt was based upon mistakes of law and fact. During the years 1943-1947,
petitioner was not a charitable organization entitled to an exemption, and the Commissioner was held to have had authority to rescind his earlier ruling and determine the
deficiencies in taxes for the taxable years.
As to deductions, however, the Commissioner's announced policy is that they shall
remain allowable until an announcement of revocation is published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin, unless the donor had knowledge of the revocation before it was
published. See Publication No. 78, Cumulative List of Organizations Described in
Section 170(c). No such policy is followed with respect to the estate and gift taxes.
The question is whether the institution qualifies on the date of the gift or bequest.
Quiggle & Myers, supra note 91, at 587.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
106. The United States is a party to five tax treaties which contain provisions for
reciprocal exemption of charitable and similar organizations from income taxation.
Australia, May 14, 1953, art. XIV, [1953] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2283, T.I.A.S. No.
2280; Canada, Mar. 4, 1942, art. X, 56 Stat. 1402, T.S. No. 983, Supp., Aug. 8, 1956,
art. XIII D, [1957] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1662, T.I.A.S. No. 3916; Honduras, June 25,
1956, art. XIV, [1957] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 3766; Japan, April 16,
1954, art. XV [1955] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 3176, Supp., Mar. 2.3 [1957]
2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1445, T.I.A.S. No. 3901; Union of South Africa, Dec. 13, 1946, art.
XI, and Supp., July 14, 1950, [1952] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3828, T.I.A.S. No. 2510.
Two of these treaties also deal with the deductibility of contributions made to such
exempt organizations. Canada, supra, art. XIII D; Honduras, supra, art. XIV.
Rev. Proc. 59-31, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 949, contains the procedure applicable for
obtaining rulings covering charities covered by the treaties with Canada and Honduras.
The procedure given in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1 (1958) and Treas. Reg. § 501(c) (3)-
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expended abroad, however, is not the only reason for this hesitance.
This is shown by the reluctance in some cases to grant exemptions to
domestic charities even when their proposed foreign donees have received favorable ruling letters. 10 7 Another major portion of the difficulty lies with the domestic organization requirement of section
170(c) (2) (A). The IRS is now becoming more strict in its position
in order to prevent avoidance of this requirement. 108 If the domestic
charity actively supervises the funds expended abroad there will
probably be little hesitation in allowing deductions for gifts to it.'0 9
There also appears to be little difficulty in obtaining a deduction for
a gift to a domestic charity which is not required by contract or
articles of incorporation to turn over funds to a particular foreign

charity.
It is the charity whose funds are earmarked for one or more
particular foreign organizations, whether or not an exempt ruling
covering them has been obtained, which may face serious problems.
It is difficult, however, to make generalizations, since the vast
majority of these cases are ruled on by private letter."n But if the
domestic organization retains enough control over foreign expenditures so that it is not merely a conduit, it will probably be safe.
B. Rulings
It was stated in October of 1959 that, on request, the IRS would
issue a ruling of exemption under section 501(c) (3), and of deductibility of gifts to such applicants under the estate and gift tax
sections, although no ruling would be issued on the question of the
deductibility of such gifts under section 170 for income tax purposes."'
In January of 1960, however, the IRS altered its position. Deductibility for income tax purposes will now be ruled on, to the extent
that in certain circumstances involving foreign gifts, donations to the
donor will be ruled non-deductible. The test announced was whether
in substance the domestic organization may be said to be soliciting
funds for the use of foreign organizations.
1 (1959), should be followed when the foreign organization is in a country other than
Canada or Honduras.
107. See Eaton, supra note 77, at 48-49.
108. Ibid.
109. "The IRS is apparently concerned with those situations in which the domestic
organization is simply a collection agent for the foreign institution and is the 'creature'
of that institution. It is not concerned with domestic organizations, such as 'CARE,'
which have their own agents in foreign countries and make their own decisions as
to distributions." Tax Barometer ff 37 (Dec. 12, 1959).
110. 17 A.B.A. SECTON OF TAXAnoN BULL. 148 (July 1964); 7 CCH 1965 STAND.
FED. TAx RE,. II 6391; 16 A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXAT'oN BULL. 130 (July 1963).
111. A.B.A. SECTION OF TAxATioN BuLL.. 33 (Oct. 1959).
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Further, if the domestic charity, in fact, uses its funds principally
for the support of foreign organizations, the IRS might consider the
contributions as made "to or for the use of" the foreign organization,
rather than the domestic organization, unless the domestic organization retains control over the use of its funds in the hands of the
foreign organizations, with the result that a deduction will be denied." 2 The authority for this position apparently is derived from the
IRS's interpretation of the provision in the regulations which allows
a deduction for a gift to a charity which meets the domestic organieven though some portion of the donee's funds
zation requirement,
113
are used abroad.
The IRS in 1961 was reported to have been working on a formal
ruling which would consolidate its policy regarding both deductibility
114
and exempt status as it has developed through private rulings.
Although no such formal ruling has been found regarding the required
characteristics of recipients of funds expended by section 501 exempt
organizations, a 1963 revenue ruling was found which discussed the
deductibility of contributions by an individual to certain domestic
charities which thereafter transmit some or all of their funds to a
foreign organization." 5
The guidelines set down in that ruling are generally the same as
had been established earlier in private decisions. Five possible situations were discussed, and decisions as to deductibility under section
170 were made:
The 'foreign organization' referred to in.each of the examples is an organization which is chartered in a foreign country and is so organized and operated
that it meets all the requirements of section 170(c) (2) of the Code excepting the [domestic organization] requirement set forth in section 170(c)
(2) (A) of the Code. The 'domestic organization' in each example is assumed
to meet all the requirements in section 170(c) (2) of the Code. In each
case, the question to be decided is whether the amounts paid to the
domestic organization are deductible under section 170(a) of the Code.
(1) In pursuance of a plan to solicit funds in this country, a foreign
organization caused a domestic organization to be formed. At the time
of formation, it was proposed that the domestic organization would
conduct a fund-raising campaign, pay the administrative expenses from
the collected fund and remit any balance to the foreign organization.
(2) Certain persons in this country, desirous of furthering a foreign
organization's work, formed a charitable organization within the United
States. The charter of the domestic organization provides that it will
receive contributions and send them, at convenient intervals, to the
foreign organization.
112. A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION BuLL.34 (Jan. 1960).

113. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(a) (1) (1958).
114. Eaton, supra note 77, at 50.
115. Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 101.
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(3) A foreign organization entered into an agreement with a domestic
organization which provides that the domestic organization will conduct a
fund-raising campaign on behalf of the foreign organization. The
domestic organization has previously received a ruling that contributions
to it are deductible under section 170 of the Code. In conducting the
campaign, the domestic organization represents to prospective contributors
that the raised funds will go to the foreign organization.
(4) A domestic organization conducts a variety of charitable activities
in a foreign country. Where its purposes can be furthered by granting
funds to charitable groups organized in the foreign country, the domestic
organization makes such grants for purposes which it has reviewed and
approved. The grants are paid from its general funds and although the
organization solicits from the public, no special fund is raised by a solicitation on behalf of particular foreign organizatons.
(5) A domestic organization, which does charitable work in a foreign
country, formed a subsidiary in that country to facilitate its operations
there. The foreign organization was formed for the purposes of administrative convenience and the domestic organization controls every facet
of its operations. In the past the domestic organization solicited contributions for the specific purpose of carrying out its charitable activities
in the foreign country and it will continue to do so in the future. However, following the formation of the foreign subsidiary, the domestic
organization will transmit funds it receives for its foreign charitable
activities directly to that organizaton.
7
6
On the authority of a 1943 case" and a 1954 revenue ruling,"
it was said that the qualifications of the donee organization are not
the only points of inquiry. If funds are donated to an organization
qualifying under the domestic organization requirement of section
170(c) (2) (A), the special earmarking of the use or destination of
funds by that donee in favor of a foreign organization would deprive

the donor of a deduction.
Also, if the donee is required for other reasons, such as a charter
provision, to turn all or any particular contribution it receives over
to another organization, it is proper to look to the qualifications of
the ultimate recipient under section 170. Thus, if such recipient
is a foreign organization, to which a direct donation would not be
deductible, then an indirect donation to it of this type would also
be non-deductible." 8 The theory here, of course, is that the ultimate
recipient is the real donee, whereas the domestic organization is
only a conduit and, thus, only a nominal donee.
For these same reasons, it was similarly stated that donations
would be non-deductible if made to an organization which had con116. S. E. Thomason, 2 T.C. 441 (1943).
117. Rev. Rul. 54-580, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 97.
118. "A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result
because reached by a devious path." Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 358
(1939); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
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tracted to conduct a fund-raising campaign on behalf of a foreign
charity, and which had represented to prospective donors that the
funds raised were to go to the foreign organization.
However, a deduction will be allowed for a donation to an organization which does not earmark its receipts in any manner, and at
the same time maintains control over the use of such funds.
In the fifth case discussed, the ruling provided that a deduction
will be allowed if the domestic donee can be considered the real
beneficiary of the donation. Thus, where the domestic charity transmits the funds to a foreign subsidiary whose expenditures it controls,
donations to it will be deductible, because the foreign organization
is merely an administrative arm of the domestic donee, and not the
ultimate donee.
Thus, if one factor were to be chosen as the key to which the IRS
will look in order to determine deductibility, it most certainly is
adequate control over the donation by the domestic organization.
This factor is important not only because it indirectly determines
how much control the IRS has over the funds, but also because it
aids in determining who is the actual beneficiary of the donation.
And the characteristics of the real beneficiary are what determine
the deductibility of a donation.
It might be said that the domestic use requirement of section
170(c) (2) has been incorporated into the domestic organization requirement by means of this revenue ruling, in that whenever the
domestic organization has any duty whatever, no matter how small,
and from whatever source, to distribute its funds abroad, a deduction
will be denied for donations received by it. This is certainly the
construction the Treasury would like to adopt.
The ruling demonstrated, however, that when the domestic organization has control over the use of the funds in the foreign country, a
deduction will be allowed for contributions to the donor. The domestic use requirement is a strict prohibition of any foreign use of
funds donated by a corporation to an organization which is not in
the corporate form. Even if a corporate donor were to have complete
control over its distributions, contributions to it would be non-deductible if they were distributed to a foreign unincorporated organization.
If domestic use is incorporated into the domestic organization
requirement by virtue of this ruling, so as to limit individuals and
other non-corporate donors from making foreign distributions, it is
only so incorporated in part. Its effect is not nearly so far-reaching
as that of section 170 (c) (2) has on corporations.
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IV. TBE FORCE AND EFFECT OF TpAsuRY RULINGS
In 1924, it was ruled that:
A corporaton formed to dispense charity which does not actually engage

in charitable undertakings itself but distributes its income to institutions

organized and operated exclusively for the purposes named in subdivision (6)

of section 231 [the 1921 Code's forerunner of the present section 501(c) (3)1
is exempt from taxation under said section. 119

This ruling was a recognition of an earlier Supreme Court holding to
2
the same effect,uo and only one case could be found which cited it.' '
That case cited it only as support for the main holding that even
though the petitioner conducted business activities for profit, it still
qualified for a tax exemption. The two cases established the controversial "ultimate destination" doctrine, which was that the statute
did not mean "that to come within the exemption a corporation may
not conduct business activities for profit. The destination of the
income is more significant than its source."1 22 This test has since
been superceded by the provision that an exempt organization may
operate a trade or business, but, in order to do so and still remain
exempt, it must operate the trade or business in furtherance of the
organization's exempt purpose. Further, the organization must not be
organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an
unrelated trade or business, as defined in section 513.123
In the 1959 Treasury Regulations promulgated under section 501(c)
(3), it was provided that,
articles stating that the organization is created solely 'to receive contribu-

tions and pay them over to organizations which are described in section

501(c) (3) and exempt from taxation under section 501 (a)' are sufficient

for purposes of the organizational test [of section 501(c) (3)1.12A

These rulings together form at least persuasive authority for the
proposition that an organization formed to carry on charitable activities which does actually engage in charitable undertakings itself and
also distributes its income to charitable organizations will maintain
its exempt status. The difficulty, of course, lies with the nature of the
operations of the recipient organization. If it does not qualify as an
exempt charity under section 501(c) (3), and particularly if a ruling
119. I.T. 1945, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 273 (1924).

120. Trinidad v. Sagrada Order, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
121. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
122. Id. at 778.
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1). See also CODE § 502, disallowing exemptions to feeder organizations.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1) (1959).
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has been requested and denied, the exempt status of the donor will
certainly be jeopardized.
It should be noted, however, that the Treasury Regulation just
cited does not require the recipient organization to be qualified
under section 501(c) (3). It merely states that a donor which gives
to an organization which is qualified will be exempt; it does not say
that a donor which gives to one which is not qualified will not be
exempt.
Nor does any other Treasury decision, published ruling, or court
decision say specifically that a donor which gives to an organization
which has not obtained an exempt ruling under section 501(c) (3)
will lose its own exempt status.
A. Informal Rulings
Since there is no formal or published ruling, the question arises
as to what authority and effect a private ruling by the Treasury
Department may have.
In 1953 it was stated that,
an I.T. is an instruction issued to the staff of the Bureau, [now Service] as
to how the law should be administered by the staff. The Bureau has no
power to make law by such an instruction, even to the125extent that the
Secretary of the Treasury may make law by regulation.

In an earlier case, it was said that "these rulings . . . [have] no

more binding or legal force than the opinions of any other
...
126 Perhaps the best statement of the rationale behind
lawyer.
the accepted rule that administrative interpretations have no binding
force is that the commissioner may not be placed "in the position of
a judge in his own cause who has written his decision before hand."127
B. Regulations
The next question which arises is what would be the result if the
Treasury Department should see fit to promulgate a regulation to the
effect that an exempt foundation, in order to maintain that status,
must show that its distributions have been made only to organizations
previously declared exempt by the Treasury Department.
The attitude of the courts toward the regulations is set forth in a
1920 case: "[A] regulation by a department of government, addressed
to and reasonably adopted to the enforcement of an act of Congress,
the administration of which is confined to such department, has the
125. Hirshon v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 135, 137 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
126. United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951).
127. Fleming v. A. H. Belo Corp., 121 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1941).
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force and effect of law if it be not in conflict with expressed
statutory provision." 128 This statement was refined in a later case:

Where the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construction, a
clarifying regulation or one indicating the method of its application to
specific cases not only is permissible but is to be given great weight by
the courts. And the same principle governs where the statute merely
expresses a general rule and invests the Secretary of the Treasury with
authority to promulgate regulations appropriate to its enforcement. But
and its
where, as in this case, the provisions of the act are unambiguous,
12 9
directions specific, there is no power to amend it by regulation.
And again in a 1963 case it was stated:
[A]n attempt to add a restriction to the statute which is not there . . .
would come within the condemnation of the decisions of the Supreme
Court, exemplified by Comissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, at page 92 [1959]
...
where the court said: 'But the section contains nothing to that effect,
and therefore, to uphold this addition to the tax would be to hold that it may
be imposed by regulation, which, of course, the law does not permit [citing
cases].'130

It certainly can be argued that the statute is not ambiguous in its
coverage, since there is no provision in which donations are required
to be given to exempt organizations. Thus, even though there is no
official ruling or decision which conflicts with what would undoubtedly

be the Commissioner's position in many cases, the fact that the Code
is unambiguous indicates that any regulation which limits the breadth
of the Code's application should not be given effect by the court.

A regulation adopted in the same form as the private letters warning against continued foreign donations discussed above 131 would be

especially pernicious, since each determination would depend on the
attitude of IRS.

It must be admitted, however, that the Treasury's position that
donations must be given to exempt organizations is a convenient
guide to potential donor-organizations. It gives them a degree of
certainty in that, since the Treasury publishes a list of exempt organi-

zations, 32 contributions may be made to listed organizations without

128. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920).
129. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1936).
130. United States v. Marett, 325 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1963).
131. See text accompanying notes 94 &95 supra.
132. E.g., Publication No. 78 (Revised to Dec. 31, 1962), Cumulative List of Organizations. See also CODE § 6104(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104-1, providing for
public inspection of applications for tax exemption. This section was modified by
Rev. Proc. 58-20, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 1134, 1137, to provide that a request for inspection of exemption applications and related documents must specify the name and
address of each organization whose application it is desired to inspect.
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concern for their own exempt status. This also eliminates much time
and expense that would otherwise be spent investigating potential
recipients. Without the restriction, smaller organizations might well
be forced to restrict their contributions to a comparatively few
organizations, since the cost of doing otherwise would likely be
prohibitive.
The Treasury's position also gives it a convenient administrative
guide. While the Treasury might not be justified in making such a
regulation with regard to domestic recipients, it would have a basis
for doing so with regard to foreign donees. The distinction is that
if a donation were made to a domestic organization whose charitable
nature was questionable, the Treasury could easily make its own
investigation to determine whether the funds were in fact being
diverted to non-charitable uses. Such an investigation, however, would
be extremely difficult in a foreign country, if not impossible.
Administrative convenience notwithstanding, it does not necessarily
follow that such an arbitrary regulation, requiring that a foreign
organization receive an exempt ruling before receiving a donation,
would be valid under the present unambiguous wording of the Code.
All indications are to the effect that if the Treasury Department
should, in the future, introduce a regulation requiring donees to be
exempt under section 501, such a regulation might well be held
unsupportable and thus invalid.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOREIGN DIsTIBUIONS

The distribution of funds by domestic charities to foreign recipients
is a practice which is not on very solid ground. The philosophy behind
the granting of a tax exemption to a charitable organization has been
expressed as follows:
The reason underlying the exemption granted by section 101(6) [now
section 501] to organizations organized and operated for charitable purposes is that the exempted taxpayer performs a public service. The common element of charitable purposes within the meaning of the section is
the relief of the public of a burden which otherwise belongs to it. Charitable
purposes are those which benefit the community by relieving it pro tanto
from an obligation which it owes to the objects of the charity as members
of the community .... 13

It may be said that the public is not relieved of a burden which
otherwise belongs to it by reason of a foreign grant. The citizens of

this country are under no obligation to keep those of another country
out of their own poor-houses. However, international relations are
133. Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1951).
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improved and increased understanding among nations is furthered
when the citizens and charitable organizations of one country give
generously to those of another. Promotion of peace and understanding among countries can certainly be deemed part of the public
burden, so as to justify an exemption granted to an organization
which distributes funds abroad.
On the other hand, the Treasury's argument that subversive organizations should be prevented from obtaining American funds
which they can use to subvert the democratic principles of this
country is admittedly a strong one, and has become more convincing
in the last ten years. 3 4 However, it probably has no place in many
cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In view of the Treasury's policy on foreign distributions as set out
above, a few conclusions can be made. The letters of warning from
the Treasury 35 are usually along the lines of a statement that the
organization's tax exempt status may be jeopardized if, after the date
of the letter, they persist in making distributions to organizations
which have not established an appropriate exempt status. This is far
from a threat to the effect that the organization's tax exempt status will
be revoked if such distributions are made. Rather, it would seem that
the warning merely means that such distributions endanger the
organization's status in that the distribution may be questioned, and
the Treasury Department can call upon the organization to prove that
the distribution was justified in view of the nature and purposes
of the recipient.
There is nothing in the Code or regulations to prevent an exempt
organization from making a donation to an organization which has
not been declared to be exempt under section 501.136 Further, it
appears unlikely that a regulation
adding this requirement to the
37
Code would be held valid.
The Treasury's position, however, even though not based on binding
authority, is probably not unreasonable when policy and administrative convenience are considered. There may well be justification for
questioning such donations
and jeopardizing the tax exempt status of
1 38
donor organizations.
If a potential donor is pre.ared to sustain the burden of proving the
propriety of a gift to its/intended non-exempt donee, which would
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See note 100 supra.
See text accompanying notes 94 & 95 supra.
See text accompanying notes 99 & 100 supra.
See note 100 supra.
See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 supra.

